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Interconnection is defined by ITU as: “the
technical and commercial arrangements by which providers connect their
equipment and networks, and provide their customers with the
possibility of access to the customers, services and networks of other
service providers[1]”
Interconnection is a central factor in determining
market structure, viability of competitors and success of regulation
programs. From the start of the telecommunications industry,
interconnection has been vital in ensuring network connectivity, but
in latter years this factor has become critical, due to the
development of multiple communication technologies–such as Internet,
mobile telephony, wireless networks, satellite systems – capable of
interacting or converging with one another and which have at the same
time permitted different competing companies to co-exist within the
same market[2].
Interconnection.
For J. Laffont and J. Tirole[3]
“an intelligent interconnection policy is the key to the development
of competition within the telecommunications industry”. The structure
and level of interconnection has important implications for the
investment decisions of carriers, for prices and for the added value
of the services that consumers receive. Consequently, the regulatory
agenda has gone from worrying only about minimizing prices and
watching over subsidies, to managing several issues related to the
competition and the entry of new enterprises[4].
The telecommunications industry has undergone
important changes in the last two decades. Two of the most significant
forces governing these changes have been the efforts to promote an
effective competition and the global expansion of telecommunications
services by means of broad promotion of technology. The changes have
transformed the structure of the property, of the industry and of the
markets within this sector; State property has become Private
property, and a state of natural monopoly has turned into one of
competition.
Unfortunately, the appearance of competition within
the telecommunications markets has not been complete, because
technology has not advanced sufficiently to enable the market to
become completely competitive[5].
In many cases, competition depends on the possibility of accessing
inputs with natural monopoly characteristics, for example, access to
networks and the possibility of interconnecting with these[6].
E. Noam[7]
points out that “control of interconnection by any agency, whether
governmental or private, has become the key by which to control the
telecommunications system and its market structure”. Thus, the main
argument to regulate access to interconnection is market power and its
potential consequences on market structure and consumers.
If the major companies, with greater number of
customers, do not interconnect with entrants, these will not have much
opportunity to attract customers because they will not be able to put
them into contact with the users of the major carrier. Experience has
shown that major companies do not provide their competitors with
access to their networks voluntarily, and even if they did, careful
regulation of interconnection policy, including technical and costs
aspects, could become necessary in order to prevent the major
companies from making use of their market power.
The regulator will endeavour–among other things–to
facilitate interconnection between the major carrier and the entrant
company; to reach non-discriminatory agreements; to promote rates
based on costs; to establish the terms and technical and commercial
conditions of the agreements; to limit the period of negotiation; to
define quality standards and include the corresponding penalties in
case of failures and to establish the mechanisms for settling disputes
among carriers[8].
In order to make negotiations easier and for
companies to reach agreements, the creation of certain general
criteria has been proposed, which must govern interconnection. The
most frequently used procedures are the creation of general guidelines
and the publication of Reference Interconnection Offers (RIO). In the
first case, the regulators establish general guidelines which must be
considered as minimum requirements in order to reach interconnection
agreements. The guidelines are not – in most cases–detailed, and they
give the carriers certain flexibility to carry out the negotiations
and shape the agreement as is most convenient to them[9].
On the other hand, the RIO contain the important
information on how interconnection shall be provided, and the plan
according to which the negotiations shall take place, particularly if
there is a major carrier. In most cases, the agreements reached under
the RIO are sent to the regulator for approval. If they are not
approved, they shall be forwarded to the carriers for their
modification, or to the Regulator for correction as it considers
necessary. The RIO offer great advantages to the new carriers because
they enable them to arrive at negotiations with greater information
regarding terms and conditions of the major carrier’s proposals.
At the XIII meeting of the Permanent Consultative
Committee I: Telecommunications a document was approved that analyzes
the terms, principles and tools available to CITEL member countries
which will enable them to implement an interconnection system that
will promote competition jointly among telecommunications carriers.
More specifically, this document contains a series
of principles that CITEL members agree to consider as critical
elements within any interconnection system. The aim of this document
is not to instruct, but rather to assist the countries in their effort
to face the rigorous task of creating and implementing interconnection
regulations. The document includes information gathered through the
CITEL study on Interconnection, as well as from the survey of CITEL
member countries carried out with the aim of updating the document on
CITEL Guidelines and Practices for Interconnection Regulations in
America. CITEL Member States, through the surveys, consigned the
requested information in order to make advances in the process of
updating the document. Among these were Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, the United States and
Venezuela.
Esther Sánchez (Venezuela)
Coordinator of Interconnexion
Rapporteur Group on Telecommunications Economic Aspects
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Additional Information: Notes:
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